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We develop a stylized model of horizontal and vertical competition in tournaments with two
competing ¯rms. The sponsor cares about the quality of the design but also about the design
location. A priori not even the sponsor knows his preferred design location, which is only discov-
ered once he has seen the actual proposals. We show that the more e±cient ¯rm is more likely
to be conservative when choosing the design location. Also, to get some di®erentiation in design
locations, the cost di®erence between contestants can neither be too small nor too big. Therefore,
if the sponsor mainly cares about the design location, participation in the tournaments by the
two lowest cost contestants cannot be optimal for the sponsor.
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Tournaments are games in which players spend resources in order to win a prize. Tourna-
ments are extensively used as allocation mechanisms, since they are easy to implement; only the
relative performance of the participants has to be evaluated, which is usually less demanding than
measuring the absolute performance. For example, tournaments are used in sports competitions
and in procurement processes.1 Promotion in labor markets, R&D races and lobbying are often
disguised tournaments. So-called contests of ideas are also tournaments that are used to promote
the generation of new ideas in particular in architecture, mechanical engineering, civil, transport
and plant engineering, in animation and freeform/artistic expression.
A historical example of a contest of ideas is the tournament used by the Florentine Republic
to choose the design of the second doors of the baptistery of the Duomo. This competition was
announced in 1401 and artists were required to design a panel representing the sacri¯ce of Isaac.
Some of the ¯nest sculptors in Florence took part in the contest. They were seven in total, among
them the two ¯nalists Filippo Brunelleschi and Lorenzo Ghiberti. The panels of the two ¯nalists
were considered equally good. While the interpretation of Ghiberti was still partly Gothic in style
and hence fairly conservative for his time, Brunelleschi presented a more modern neoclassical
design. Ghiberti's design won, not on the basis of quality but simply because it was easier to
understand.2 Ghiberti's victory was a pure matter of taste.3 The two designs were horizontally
di®erentiated, and it was this horizontal competition that was decisive in choosing the winner.
While working on their respective designs, the artists had to take two decisions, namely, (i)
how to represent the sacri¯ce of Isaac and (ii) how much e®ort to put into this representation.
Compared to the decision which interpretation to adopt the e®ort decision is costly and determines
the ¯nal quality of the design. We therefore refer to the ¯rst decision as horizontal competition
1Fullerton and McAfee (1999) provide several examples of procurement process that have been carried out using
tournaments. See Fullerton and McAfee (1999) for details.
2see http//www.mega.it/eng/egui/monu/bo.htm
3The two panels they presented for the competition are now exhibited beside each other in the Museum of the
Bargello.
1and to the competition in e®ort levels (quality) as vertical competition.
While the economic literature on tournaments is vast and has studied many relevant aspects
like one prize versus multiple prizes,4 complete information and incomplete information scenarios,5
to our knowledge it has neglected the fact that in many tournaments participants do not only
compete in e®ort and consequently in design quality but also in design location, i.e. there is some
degree of horizontal competition. While this is especially relevant for contests of ideas, it might
also a®ect other types of tournaments, e.g. labor market competitions. Lower level managers
might compete for promotion by suggesting di®erent competitive strategies for the ¯rm. Which
kind of strategy is chosen often depends on the preferences of the general manager.
The study of horizontal competition in tournaments is also important because contests of ideas
are normally used to generate ideas, i.e. in situations where the sponsor does not really know
what he wants. If the general managers had a clear idea about the best strategy for the ¯rm,
he would simply order his subordinate managers to implement this strategy. However, he often
needs them for generating new business strategies. Similarly, in architectural competitions the
sponsor usually knows the type of building he wants, e.g. a museum, a concert hall or a bridge;
he also knows that he wants good quality; but a priori he has no clear idea which type of design
he would like most, simply because he cannot even imagine all possible types of design. He needs
the actual design proposals to learn his ex post preferences.
The aim of this paper is to study a tournament in which the contest success function depends
both on the e®ort exerted by the participants (vertical competition) and on the type of design
chosen by the participants (horizontal competition). We present a very stylized model in which
contest participants face some uncertainty on the sponsor's preferences. We do not attempt to
build a general model of vertical and horizontal competition in tournaments, but use the simplest
possible model with only two possible design locations and two competing ¯rms to show that some
4Most papers study tournaments with a single prize (e.g. Tullock (1980), Wright (1983), Dixit (1987),Baye et al
(1993) and (1996), Amann and Leiniger (1996), Fullerton and McAfee (1999), Lizzeri and Perisco (2000). Glazer
and Hassin (1988) and Moldovanu and Sela (2001) study a contest with multiple prizes.
5Compete information scenaries are among others: Tullock (1980), Dixit (1987), Glazer and Hassin (1988) and
Baye et al (1993) and (1996). Amann and Leiniger (1996) and Lizzeri and Perisco (2000) study all-pay auctions
with incompete information.
2degree of horizontal competition in a classical model of tournaments can lead to qualitatively
di®erent results. In particular, it can change known results about optimal entry.
A well established result in tournaments is that limiting entry can be an optimal strategy
for two reasons: on the one hand, limiting entry can rise the e®ort level of contestants, since it
increases their probability of winning. On the other hand, it reduces costs; fewer o®ers have to
be evaluated. Nalebu® and Stiglizt (1983) show that the overall e®ort in a labor contract can be
decreasing in the number of workers participating in the contest. Taylor (1995) proves a similar
result for research tournaments with homogenous contestants. Fullerton and McAfee (1999) study
a research tournaments with heterogenous contestants and conclude that the optimal number of
contestants is two, and that these two contestants have to be the lowest cost contestants. In this
paper we show that Fullerton and McAfee's (1999) result may not be robust to the introduction
of horizontal competition. In our model, in which the number of contestants is restricted to two,
it might be bene¯cial for the sponsor if the contestants are di®erentiated in costs. If the two
participants have similar costs (for example, if they were the lowest cost ¯rms in the industry),
they choose similar designs, too. But if the sponsor mainly cares about the type of design, it is
worthy for him to get the lowest cost ¯rm and a ¯rm with high enough costs to compete in the
contest. In this way, the less e±cient contestant is willing to choose a di®erent design location
than the design chosen by the more e±cient ¯rm, and the sponsor has a higher probability to get
a good match between one of the actual design proposals with his preferred design location.
While limiting the number of possible designs to two is obviously a restriction of our model,
we are con¯dent that a more general model would also modify standard results about optimal
entry in tournaments. There is a very intuitive reason for this, which the present model does not
capture. Increasing the number of participants, increases the number of proposals and diversity
can have some value in a horizontal competition framework, especially in situations where design
proposals help the sponsor to learn his ex post preferences.
A second result of the paper is that the more e±cient contestant is more likely to choose the
design with the higher ex ante probability for being the sponsor's preferred design. We call this
3design the conservative design and label the other design as radical. This result nicely ¯ts with
the contest held by the Florentine Republic for the second doors of the baptistery. The result
is also very much in line with those derived by Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Cabral (1999)
in very di®erent (and dynamic) models. Prendergast and Stole (1996) show that youngsters who
have no reputation to defend are more impetuous than old-timers who have to worry about the
information that their new decision reveals concerning their past decisions. Cabral (1999) studies
the important issue in which situation to choose an R&D project with a high variance versus a
project with a low variance. He shows that the laggard has nothing to loose, i.e. the follower
chooses a riskier project than the leader. However, unlike in Cabral (1999) in our model it is not
always the ine±cient ¯rm that is impetuous/radical. If ¯rms are not too di®erent and the sponsor
is not very likely to be conservative, multiple equilibria exist: it might be the e±cient ¯rm that
chooses the radical design while the ine±cient ¯rm is more conservative.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is introduced while
Section 3 solves the second stage of the model: the e®ort decision. In Section 4 we solve the
¯rst stage of the model and present the main results of the paper. Section 5 discusses the scope
and implications of the model and presents conclusions. All proofs are relegated to a technical
appendix.
2 The model
Consider a sponsor (administration) who wants to undertake a public project but does not
have a clear idea about the design of the project. To learn about possible designs, the sponsor
organizes a contest of ideas. Two risk neutral ¯rms, ¯rm 1 and ¯rm 2, compete in the contest.
The rules of the contest are simple: ¯rst the sponsor announces the prize P for the winner of the
contest. Then participants submit design proposals and ¯nally the sponsor selects a design and
thereby the winner of the contest.
We assume that the design competition has two dimensions: location of the design d and e®ort
in developing the design e. We restrict the space of design locations to only two possible design
4locations: conservative (C), and radical (R). Location captures the type of design. A conservative
design is a design that is most likely to be the preferred design of the sponsor, since for example it
is close to one that won in a previous contest or since it is the current fashion; by radical designs
we mean \vanguard" designs that are less likely close to the sponsor's preferences. The e®ort is
a variable related to the quality of the design. The bigger the e®ort of the ¯rm, the higher the
expected quality of the design, where quality is an index whether or not a given design is well
done: some conservative (radical) designs might be better than others.
Each ¯rm has to choose ¯rst the design location di and then the amount of e®ort ei it puts
into developing the chosen type of design. The quality of the chosen design is linked to the ¯rm's
e®ort, but the relation between e®ort and actual produced quality is not deterministic. The bigger
the e®ort of the ¯rm is, the higher is the expected but not necessarily the actual quality of the
design produced by this ¯rm. There is no cost associated to choosing the design location. The
cost of e®ort for ¯rm i is ciei. Without loss of generality we assume that ¯rm 1 is more e±cient
than ¯rm 2, i.e., c2 ¸ c1.
The sponsor cares about the type of design and its quality. On the one hand, he wants to
maximize the quality of the design location. On the other hand he wants to minimize the distance
between the project design and his preferred design location. A priori the sponsor and the ¯rms
face some uncertainty about this preferred design location. With probability ® > 0:5 the sponsor
prefers the conservative design while with probability 1 ¡ ® he prefers the radical design. Once
the sponsor sees the actual design proposals this uncertainty is resolved and the sponsor learns
his preferred design location.
We do not state the exact form of the preferences of the sponsor but use the following contest
success function instead which can be seen as a reduced form of the sponsor's maximization
problem. The contest success function tells us the probability that ¯rm i wins the contest given
that it had submitted a design (di;ei).
pi(di;ei;dj;ej;dp;¸) =
( ei
ei+ej if di = dj
(1 ¡ ¸) ei
ei+ej + ¸hi(di;dj;dp) if di 6= dj
5where hi is the comparative advantage of ¯rm i due to horizontal competition
hi(di;dj;dp) ==
(
1 if di 6= dj and di = dp
0 Otherwise
and ¸ 2 [0;1] is a measure of the transportation cost. We can interpret ¸ as the relative weight
given to the design location with respect to quality in the sponsor's preferences. This contest
success function captures both aims of the sponsor (to maximize quality and to get as close as
possible to his preferred design location), his initial uncertainty about his preferred design location
and the stochastic production of quality by ¯rms.
Notice that for ¸ = 0 this contest success function coincides with the standard contest success
function introduced by Tullock (1980). Fullerton and McAfee (1999) have shown that this contest
success function can be derived from the following model of quality production: the choice of ei
determines the number of identical and independent draws6 from some distribution function over
the interval [0;1]. The resulting quality of these draws is the maximum of these random draws.
The timing of the model is the following:
1. Nature choose the distribution of the preferences of the sponsor de¯ned by ® and the
marginal cost ci of e®ort for each ¯rm i.
2. The sponsor announces the contest and the prize P for the winning ¯rm.
3. The competing ¯rms choose simultaneously the design location di.
4. The ¯rms choose simultaneously the e®ort level ei to develop the chosen type of design.
5. The sponsor's preferred design is determined by nature.
6. The winning ¯rm is determined by nature according to the design proposals and the contest
success function.
The game is solved by backward induction. All the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
6For convenience ei is not restricted to be an integer.
63 The effort decision
When choosing how much e®ort to put into developing their design, ¯rms already know the
design locations which were chosen. The di®erent situations that the ¯rms can face, can be
summarized by the following two main cases:
1. If both ¯rms chose the same design, namely (C;C) or (R;R), the e®ort in developing the
design will be decisive, since no ¯rm has a locational advantage with respect to the other
and the contest success function only depends on e®ort levels. Each ¯rm's problem becomes
max
ei







It is now easy to show, that the solution to this Nash game is characterized by the following
¯rst order conditions:
Pe2
(e1 + e2)2 ¡ c1 = 0
Pe1
(e1 + e2)2 ¡ c2 = 0:







In this case the ¯rm with lower costs makes the higher e®ort and has a bigger chance to be
the winner of the contest. The expected pro¯ts of the ¯rms are:





(c1 + c2)2 =
Pc2
2
(c1 + c2)2 = P±2





(c1 + c2)2 =
Pc2
1
(c1 + c2)2 = P(1 ¡ ±)2
where ± = c2
c1+c2 represents the probability that ¯rm 1 wins the contest if no ¯rm has a
comparative advantage in design location. Notice that ± 2 [0:5;1] since c2 ¸ c1: Therefore,
the pro¯ts of the more e±cient ¯rm are higher.
72. If one ¯rm chooses the conservative location and the other ¯rm a radical design, i.e. (C;R)
or (R;C) , e®ort levels will depend on the relative importance of design location and quality
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Notice that the e®ort level is lower than under 1.) and it is decreasing in ¸. The more
weight the sponsor puts on design location, the lower is the competition in e®ort levels.
The expected pro¯ts of the ¯rms, when ¯rm 1 chooses the conservative design, and ¯rm 2








(c1 + c2)2 +¸(1 ¡ ®)P = (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ±)2P + ¸(1 ¡ ®)P
Finally, the expected pro¯ts of the ¯rms, when ¯rm 1 chooses the conservative design, and








(c1 + c2)2 + ¸®P = (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ±)2P + ¸®P
84 The location decision
Now, we can de¯ne the payo® matrix of the ¯rst stage game as follows taking the second stage






¼2(C;C) = (1 ¡ ±)2P
¼1(C;R) = (1 ¡ ¸)±2P + ¸®P
¼2(R;C) = (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ±)2P + ¸(1 ¡ ®)P
R
¼1(C;R) = (1 ¡ ¸)±2P + ¸(1 ¡ ®)P
¼2(R;C) = (1 ¡¸)(1 ¡ ±)2P + ¸®P
¼1(R;R) = ±2P
¼2(R;R) = (1 ¡ ±)2P
Player 1 is the row player and player 2 is the column player. Player 1's payo®s are represented
in the upper corner of each cell.
4.1 The equilibrium outcome
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium outcome of the ¯rst stage
Proposition 1 The equilibrium in the ¯rst stage is:
1. If (1 ¡ ±)2 > 1 ¡ ® ¯rms locate at (C;C) .
2. If (1 ¡ ±)2 < 1 ¡ ® and ±2 > ® both ¯rms use a mixed strategy. Firm 1 locates at C with
probability ¯¤ and ¯rm 2 locates at C with probability ¾¤, where ¯¤ and ¾¤ are
¯¤ =
® ¡ (1 ¡ ±)2




3. If (1 ¡ ±)2 < 1 ¡ ® and ® > ±2 > 1 ¡ ®, ¯rms locate at (C;R).
4. If (1¡±)2 < 1¡® and ±2 < 1¡®, there is multiplicity of equilibria. The two pure equilibria
are 1) ¯rm 1 locates at C while ¯rm 2 chooses location R, 2) ¯rm 1 locates at R while ¯rm
92 chooses location C. In the mixed strategy equilibrium ¯rm 1 locates at C with probability
¯¤¤ and ¯rm 2 locates at C with probability ¾¤¤, where ¯¤¤ and ¾¤¤ are
¯¤¤ =
® ¡ (1 ¡ ±)2












® = 0:5 ® = 0:75 ® = 1
Figure 1 shows how the equilibrium outcomes vary with ® and the cost di®erences (comparative
(dis)advantage) of the two ¯rms. First, notice that the solution of the location stage does not
depend on the parameter ¸; although e®ort decisions and pro¯ts do.
The solution of the game is quite intuitive. Consider ® larger than 0.75. In this case the
conservative design has a big advantage over the radical design. Therefore, if the comparative
cost advantage of ¯rm 1 is not very large, none of the ¯rms wants to give up the privilege of being
located at the conservative design: the equilibrium is (C;C); ¯rms only compete in e®ort levels.
For intermediate levels of comparative advantage, the ine±cient ¯rm will give up the conservative
design and locates at the radical design since the competition in e®ort levels is too costly for
this ¯rm. In this case there is maximal di®erentiation of design locations and the total e®ort
exerted by ¯rms is reduced. Finally, if the comparative advantage is large, the e±cient ¯rm has
a very high probability of winning the competition in e®ort levels. This ¯rm therefore tries to
force this competition by choosing the same design as the ine±cient ¯rm while the latter tries to
10avoid the competition in e®ort levels by choosing a di®erent location than the e±cient ¯rm.7 The
equilibrium in this case is in mixed strategies.
If ® is lower than 0.75, the analysis of the equilibria is the same except for small values of
±. If the di®erence in competitive advantage is small the equilibrium changes from (C;C) to
multiplicity of equilibria. It is worthwhile for both ¯rms to avoid the costly competition in e®ort
since the sponsor's preferences are more likely to be radical.
The next corollaries provide additional characterizations of this equilibrium.
Corollary 1 (i) Maximal di®erentiation in design locations is obtained for intermediate levels
for comparative advantage. (ii) The e®ort level is non-monotonic in the comparative advantage
of ¯rm 1.
Corollary 1 has important implications for a more general model with optimal entry into the
tournament. It shows why well-established results of optimal entry into tournaments might be
modi¯ed by the introduction of horizontal competition, in particular the results that the sponsor
wants to induce the participation of the two lowest cost contestants and that any technological
improvement which implies some cost reduction of the participating ¯rms always increases the
overall e®ort exerted by ¯rms. Part (i) of Corollary 1 tells us that whether or not entry by the
lowest cost contestants is optimal depends on the relative weight the sponsor gives to the design
location. In particular, if ¸ is large, i.e. the sponsor mainly cares about design, this sponsor would
like to induce participation in the contest of ¯rms that have not too di®erent and not too equal
costs to achieve maximal di®erentiation in design locations which guarantees a better match of
one of the design proposals with the sponsor's preferred design. Part (ii) of Corollary 1 states
the unintuitive result that a reduction in costs of the most e±cient ¯rm can lead to a reduction
in e®ort of both ¯rms and therefore in expected quality. To illustrate this point assume that
before the cost reduction both ¯rms choose the central design. The resulting sum of e®ort levels
is e1 + e2 = P
c1+c2. A cost reduction of ¯rm 1 to c
0
1 might imply that it is bene¯cial for ¯rm 2 to
7This result is similar to Cabral (1999), where the laggard wants to di®erentiate from the leader whereas the
leader wants to follow the follower.





. It is easy to see
that there exist some parameter values of c
0
1 and ¸ such that the overall e®ort level is lower after
the cost reduction of ¯rm 1.
Corollary 2 For all parameter values with a unique equilibrium the ¯rm with the cost advantage
makes higher (expected) pro¯ts. The pro¯ts of the less e±cient ¯rm are increasing in ¸.
The ¯rst part of the result is intuitive and does not need further explanations. When ¸
increases the competition in e®ort levels decreases since the horizontal competition becomes more
important. This reduction in competition in e®ort levels increases the pro¯ts of both ¯rms: less
e®ort is exerted which reduces ¯rms' cost, but also the comparative advantage of the most e±cient
¯rm is reduced. As both e®ects reinforce each other in case of the less e±cient ¯rm we can conclude
that its pro¯ts are increasing in ¸:
Corollary 3 For all parameter values with a unique equilibrium the disadvantaged ¯rm is more
likely to choose a radical design.
The intuition of this result is straightforward: given its comparative disadvantage when com-
peting in e®ort levels, the ine±cient ¯rm has a bigger interest than the e±cient ¯rm in achieving
an equilibrium with di®erentiated design locations. Since the radical design is the less attractive
design, choosing the radical design is a way to get the di®erentiated equilibrium.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a very stylized model of horizontal and vertical competition in
tournaments. We show that introducing horizontal competition in a standard research tournament
can change some well known results. In particular, entry into the tournament by the lowest cost
contestants may not be optimal for a sponsor who mainly cares about design, since some cost
di®erence between ¯rms can induce them to choose di®erent design locations.
There are obviously many elements that should be included in a more full-°eshed model of
contests of ideas. In particular, the set of design locations should be richer, e.g. it could be an
12entire Hotelling line. The analysis with the entire Hotelling line could be done using a similar
technique than Aragones and Palfrey (2001) who study the policy choice in a Downsian model of
two-candidate elections with one advantaged candidate and in which the location of the ideal point
of the median voter is uncertain. The policy space is a grid, hence policy locations are discrete.8
Similarly to our result, they show that the advantaged candidate adopts more moderate policies
than the disadvantaged candidate. However, the decision of their agents is one-dimensional, while
our agents' decision is two-dimensional: the design location and the e®ort put into developing
the design. Therefore, it is unclear in how far their technique, namely to approximate continuous
locations by letting the number of discrete designs in the grid go to in¯nite, could be applied to
the present context.
In the industrial organization literature there are few papers using both horizontal and vertical
competition and existing models - like the present article - tend to be very simple and fairly
restrictive. In Motta and Polo (1997) TV channels are horizontally di®erentiated, but this is
taken as an exogenous variable and it is analyzed how this variety a®ects the quality decisions of
¯rms. Irmen and Thisse (1998) extend Hotelling's analysis to a n-dimensional characteristic space
and show that ¯rms will only compete severely among one dimension (maximum di®erentiation)
and locate at the same point in all other dimensions. While working with n-dimensions, Irmen
and Thisse (1998) only consider horizontal characteristics.9 In contrast, our model considers very
di®erent types of competition, one which is costly (e®ort), one which is not (design location) and
is furthermore complicated by the existence of uncertainty.
We motivated this uncertainty by arguing that a contest of ideas is often used to create ideas
and that the sponsor does not really know what he wants before seeing the proposals of the
participants in the contest. We used a simple static approach to model this uncertainty. A priori
only the distribution of the preferred design is known to both the sponsor and the ¯rms. Once
8The present model with two design locations could be translated into a model with a central design and two
extreme designs that are equally likely to be the principal's preferred design. In a previous version of the present
paper we analyzed this alternative model. We decided to present the current version of the model since the analysis
is simpler and the results are qualitatively the same.
9Neven and Thisse (1990) ¯nd a min-max con¯guration for a model with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic.
13the design proposals have been made the uncertainty is resolved according to this distribution.
A more realistic model of learning about preferences would require the possibility of introducing
new design locations of which the sponsor was initially unaware. This is left for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Notice that for ¯rm 2 the best strategy when ¯rm 1 plays radical is
to plays C, since (1 ¡ ±)2 < 1
4 and ® > 1
4: To solve the ¯rst stage game, we have to distinguish
four cases.
Case 1: (1 ¡ ±)2 > 1 ¡ ®: In this case it is a dominant strategy for ¯rm 2 to choose C, since
(1¡±)2 > 1¡® ) (1¡±)2P > (1¡¸)(1¡±)2P +¸(1¡®)P. If ¯rm 2 plays C, the best response
of ¯rm 1 is to play C, since (1 ¡ ±)2 > 1 ¡ ® ) ±2 > 1 ¡ ® ) ±2P > (1 ¡ ¸)±2P + ¸(1 ¡ ®)P.
Hence, the only Nash equilibrium is that both ¯rms choose the central design (C;C).
Case 2: (1 ¡ ±)2 < 1 ¡ ® and ±2 > ®: In this case there is no equilibrium is pure strategies,
since ¯rm 1 wants to choose ¯rm 2's location and ¯rm 2 want to choose a di®erent location than
¯rm 1. To analyze the equilibrium in mixed strategies we compute the best response function of
the ¯rms. Let ¯ (¾) be the optimal probability with which ¯rm 1 chooses C if ¯rm 2 plays C
with probability ¾. Straightforward calculations show that
¯(¾) =
1 if ¾ > ±2¡®
2±2¡1
2 [0;1] if ¾ = ±2¡®
2±2¡1
0 if ¾ < ±2¡®
2±2¡1
Let ¾(¯) be the optimal probability with which ¯rm 2 chooses C if ¯rm 1 plays C with probability
¯. Straightforward calculations show that
¾ =
0 if ¯ >
®¡(1¡±)2
1¡2(1¡±)2
2 [0;1] if ¯ =
®¡(1¡±)2
1¡2(1¡±)2
1 if ¯ <
®¡(1¡±)2
1¡2(1¡±)2
Given these reaction functions the equilibrium in mixed strategies is that ¯rm 1 plays C with
probability ¯¤ =
®¡(1¡±)2
1¡2(1¡±)2 and ¯rm 2 plays C with probability ¾¤ = ±2¡®
2±2¡1.
Case 3: (1¡±)2 < 1¡® and ® > ±2 > 1¡®: In this case it is a dominant strategy for ¯rm 1 to
14choose C, since ±2 > 1¡® ) ±2P > (1¡¸)±2P+¸(1¡®)P and ±2 < ® ) ±2P < (1¡¸)±2P+¸®P.
If ¯rm 1 plays C the best response of ¯rm 2 is to play R; since (1 ¡ ±)2 < 1 ¡ ® ) (1 ¡ ±)2P <
(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ±)2P + ¸(1 ¡ ®)P: Hence, the only Nash equilibrium is (C;R).
Case 4: (1 ¡ ±)2 < 1 ¡ ® and ±2 < 1 ¡ ®: On the one hand, the best response of ¯rm 1
if ¯rm 2 plays C is to play R; since ±2 < 1 ¡ ® ) ±2P < (1 ¡ ¸)±2P + ¸(1 ¡ ®)P and if
¯rm 2 plays R is to play C; since ±2 < 1 ¡ ® ) ±2 < ® ) ±2P < (1 ¡ ¸)±2P + ¸®P On
the other hand, the best response of ¯rm 2 if ¯rm 1 plays C is to play R; since (1 ¡ ±)2 <
1 ¡ ® ) (1 ¡ ±)2P < (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ±)2P + ¸(1 ¡ ®)P and if ¯rm 1 plays R is to play C; since
(1 ¡ ±)2 < 1 ¡ ® ) (1 ¡ ±)2 < ® ) (1 ¡ ±)2P < (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ±)2P + ¸®P. Therefore, it is easy
to see that we have two pure equilibria in this case: (R;C) and (C;R): Similar calculations as in
Case 2 allow us to derive the mixed equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 1: Without loss of generality we assume that c1 +c2 = 1 (this is a normal-
ization). To show that the e®ort level is non-monotonic in the comparative advantage of ¯rm 1
we have to di®erentiated between two cases: Case 1) ® > 0:75 and case 2) ® < 0:75.




(c1 + c2)2 = ±P and e2 =
c1P
(c1 + c2)2 = (1 ¡ ±)P:




(c1 + c2)2 = (1 ¡ ¸)±P and e2 =
(1 ¡ ¸)c1P
(c1 + c2)2 = (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ±)P
Therefore, for a given ®, when the cost advantage of ¯rm 1 increases, the equilibrium
changes from (C;C) to (C;R) and the ¯rm's e®ort decreases. But if ± increases more such
that ±2 > ®; we know from proposition 1 that the location stage has a mixed strategy
equilibrium and the expected e®ort exerted by the ¯rms are
Efe1g = (1 ¡ °)±P + °(1 ¡ ¸)±P and Efe2g = (1 ¡°)(1 ¡ ±)P + °(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ±)P
15where ° = ¯¤+ ¾¤ ¡2¯¤ ¾¤. These e®ort levels are higher than those corresponding to the
equilibrium (C;R):
2. Let ® < 0:75. We can use the same argument to show that the e®ort level can increase when
± increases and ±2 becomes greater than ®:
Proof of Corollary 2: If both ¯rms choose the same design (Case 1 (1 ¡ ±)2 > 1 ¡ ®) ¦1 =
±2P > ¦2 = (1 ¡ ±)2P, since ± = c2
c2+c1 > 1
2. If ¯rm 1 locates at C, while ¯rm 2 chooses a
radical design (Case 3: (1 ¡ ±)2 < 1 ¡ ® and ® > ±2 > 1 ¡ ®), ¦1 = ±2P > (1 ¡ ®)P >
(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ±)2P + ¸(1 ¡ ®)P = ¦2. Finally, if both ¯rms mix over design locations (Case 2:
(1 ¡ ±)2 < 1 ¡ ® and ±2 > ®:), observe that ¦1 = ¾¤±2P + (1 ¡ ¾¤)((1 ¡ ¸)±2P + ¸®P) > ®
since ±2 > ®, and ¦2 = (1 ¡ ¯¤)(1 ¡ ±)2P + ¯¤((1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ±)2P + ¸(1 ¡ ®)P) < (1 ¡ ®)since
(1 ¡ ±)2 < 1 ¡ ®. Therefore, ¦1 > ® > 1 ¡ ® > ¦2. This conclude the proof.
Proof of Corollary 3: From proposition 1 it can be seen that for some parameter values the
disadvantaged ¯rm chooses the radical design while the advantaged ¯rm chooses the conservative
design. We only have to show that when both ¯rms choose a completely mixed design location
¯¤ > ¾¤ always.
¯¤ ¡ ¾¤ =
(2±2 ¡ 1)(® ¡ (1 ¡ ±)2) ¡ (1 ¡ 2(1 ¡ ±)2)(±2 ¡ ®)
(1 ¡ 2(1 ¡ ±)2)(2±2 ¡ 1)
Straightforward calculations show that
¯¤ ¡¾¤ =
(2® ¡ 1)(±2 ¡(1 ¡ ±)2)
(1 ¡ 2(1 ¡ ±)2)(2±2 ¡ 1)
> 0
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